I argue that Reinach provides a qualitative ontology of social acts. I focus on his idea of “essential connections, which can be specified both as whole-parts constituency connections and as existential dependency connections between wholes and other entities, and show that both constituency and existential dependence connections are subject to various degrees of constraint: they can be also possible, and not only necessary connections. I point out that social acts are subject to modifications both of their parts and of the entities upon which they existentially depend. Their modifiable ontological structure involves a dynamic eidetics: they are wholes that can be expanded and subject to integrations in time
Social acts as wholes: dynamic eidetics and qualitative modifications / DE VECCHI, FRANCESCA MARIA. - In: NEW YEARBOOK FOR PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY. - ISSN 1533-7472. - XIX:(2022).
Social acts as wholes: dynamic eidetics and qualitative modifications
Francesca De Vecchi
2022-01-01
Abstract
I argue that Reinach provides a qualitative ontology of social acts. I focus on his idea of “essential connections, which can be specified both as whole-parts constituency connections and as existential dependency connections between wholes and other entities, and show that both constituency and existential dependence connections are subject to various degrees of constraint: they can be also possible, and not only necessary connections. I point out that social acts are subject to modifications both of their parts and of the entities upon which they existentially depend. Their modifiable ontological structure involves a dynamic eidetics: they are wholes that can be expanded and subject to integrations in timeI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.