A Priori of the Law and Values in the Social Ontology of Wilhelm Schapp and Adolf Reinach

In my paper, I investigate the problem of whether, and how, in Schapp’s( Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht. Eine phänomenologische Untersuchung ) andReinach’s ( Die apriorischen Grundlagen des burgerlichen Rechts ) theories of apriori structures of the law, values can be connected with the law in an a priori relation.I suggest that, ultimately, Schapp’s foundation of the law in the evaluations ofvalues is not as such an a priori foundation, while Reinach’s eidetics of the lawinvolves genuine a priori connections, but they solely concern the being of thesocial and legal entities and are not grounded in values . Nevertheless, I argue thatSchapp’s theory of the a priori foundations of the law in values entails an analysisof the ontological status of values, of the sociality of values and of the sharing ofvalues from which emerges an account of the existential relation between law andvalues that is very signifi cant for social ontology. I point out that such account opensup a quite fruitful perspective on the existential foundation of the law, grounded onthe essential tendency of human beings to enjoy values to the full. I underline thatthis perspective represents a completely new and compelling inquiry by socialontology into the existential quality of social entities and into the greater or lesserdegrees of vitality, fullness, fairness, etc. of social entities. I suggest that this is acrucial point which has to be highlighted not only in order to do justice to Schapp,but also to devote greater attention to the needs of the Life-world in socialontology.