Alles Leben ist Stellungnehmen - Die Person als Praktisches Subjekt

According to the assumption underlying this paper, phenomenology is a method for thinking the novelty of things, as irreducible to their (physical, biological, psychological) foundations. In this paper I shall exemplify this claim by addressing a question debated in contemporary philosophy of mind, analytical ontology, moral and natural philosophy, namely: what makes a human person out of a member of the biological species homo sapiens? I argue that Lynne Baker’s proposal is not entirely satisfactory. Being an individual of the Species Homo sapiens and enjoying a First Person Perspective, though a sufficient condition, is not the grounding one. I shall argue that only a subject of acts can enjoy a First Person Perspective. The arguments for my claim are part of a general theory of acts, including voluntary actions, mental acts, speech acts and social acts, providing the foundation for a theory of personal identity and research in the field of social cognition.