Emotional Perception as Perception of Values. A Phenomenological Analysis

The aim of this work will be twofold. On the one hand, we will propose a phenomenological account of vicarious emotions. For this purpose we will focus on the careful analysis of fellow-feelings conducted by Max Ferdinand Scheler in The Nature of Sympathy (1923). We will propose a three variables model that will help us explain the elements of vicarious emotions, focusing, in particular, on the object of those phenomena. We will also provide an account of the difference between the nature of those phenomena and the level of consciousness that the subject of them can have in any given case. On the other hand, stemming from an analysis of the object of fellow-feelings, we will show which specific act of presentation is more suitable for value-qualities (Husserl 1901, 1913) – that will be shown to be the object of fellow-feelings in general. We will show that for value-qualities the act that presents the object in propria persona is a kind of perception, in particular affective perception. In this way, our account could be described as a partially non-conceptualist view on emotions as acts of presentation of value-qualities.