In recent years, the study of decision making has pro- vided a paradigmatic case of "crossbreeding" of dif- ferent disciplines. The integration of economics, psy- chology and neurosciences within neuroeconomics calls for more accurate and comprehensive models of human rationality, which may be obtained by combin- ing diverse theoretical approaches and experimental techniques. In this respect, neuroeconomics con- tributes to a naturalistic, brain-based, explanation of human agency. However, although contemporary nat- uralism insists on the unitary aspect of reality, we stress that supporting unitary study of nature is not the same as supporting a single, fundamental disci- pline to which all higher-order analyses could (or should) be reduced. We argue for integration, rather than reduction as the best approach to a naturalistic explanation of human decision making, and we claim that supporting epistemological pluralism does not mean being committed to any specific ontological po- sition. However, we suggest that an "emergentist" on- tology is the best candidate to integrate the epistemo- logical analysis here endorsed
"In search of the neurobiological basis of decison-making, explanation, reduction and emergence " (con M. Di Francesco e M. Colombo), in P. Churchand, M. Di Francessco (eds.) Functional Neurology , n.4. 2007 , pp. 197-204
MOTTERLINI , MATTEO MARIO PIETRO
2007-01-01
Abstract
In recent years, the study of decision making has pro- vided a paradigmatic case of "crossbreeding" of dif- ferent disciplines. The integration of economics, psy- chology and neurosciences within neuroeconomics calls for more accurate and comprehensive models of human rationality, which may be obtained by combin- ing diverse theoretical approaches and experimental techniques. In this respect, neuroeconomics con- tributes to a naturalistic, brain-based, explanation of human agency. However, although contemporary nat- uralism insists on the unitary aspect of reality, we stress that supporting unitary study of nature is not the same as supporting a single, fundamental disci- pline to which all higher-order analyses could (or should) be reduced. We argue for integration, rather than reduction as the best approach to a naturalistic explanation of human decision making, and we claim that supporting epistemological pluralism does not mean being committed to any specific ontological po- sition. However, we suggest that an "emergentist" on- tology is the best candidate to integrate the epistemo- logical analysis here endorsedI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.