Is so‑called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?

This paper addresses the title question and provides an argument for the conclusion that so-called phenomenal intentionality, in both its relational and non-relational construals, cannot be identified with intentionality meant as the property for a mental state to be about something. A main premise of the argument presented in support of that conclusion is that a necessary requirement for a property to be identified with intentionality is that it satisfy the features taken to be definitory of it, namely: the possible non-existence of the intentional object (the fact that an intentional state may be directed towards something that does not exist) and aspectuality (the fact that what is intended is always intended in some way, under some specific aspect, from a particular perspective). By taking this premise on board, I attempt to show that phenomenal intentionality cannot be identified with intentionality because, appearances notwithstanding, it ultimately satisfies neither of the two above mentioned features