The aim of this paper is to show how David Hume’s ethics, far from being a naïve sentimentalism, accounts better that its contemporary resumptions for the need to ground morality not on our immediate emotional reactions, but rather on sympathy cor- rected assuming a general point of view. Similarly, Adam Smith’s ethics moves from the sa- me premises and the same needs, although he achieves a deepened account of the impartial standpoint needed to account for moral judgment. Understanding their proposals is not only relevant exegetically, but also because it might point at the elements in their theories that are worth considering in contemporary debates.

Simpatia e punti di vista fermi e generali. David Hume contro il sentimentalismo ingenuo

Sarah Songhorian
2022

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show how David Hume’s ethics, far from being a naïve sentimentalism, accounts better that its contemporary resumptions for the need to ground morality not on our immediate emotional reactions, but rather on sympathy cor- rected assuming a general point of view. Similarly, Adam Smith’s ethics moves from the sa- me premises and the same needs, although he achieves a deepened account of the impartial standpoint needed to account for moral judgment. Understanding their proposals is not only relevant exegetically, but also because it might point at the elements in their theories that are worth considering in contemporary debates.
sympathy, David Hume, Adam Smith, impartial spectator, sentimentalism
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11768/131375
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