My contribution aims at drawing a new way of inclusion in the citizenry asalternative to the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This way should be able to includethe so called ‘unreasonable’ in the public debate. These people are ‘unreasonable’as they do not share public values but firmly hold a traditional set of values oftenconflicting with the public ones. My point is that a stable modus vivendi represents amore realistic device of inclusion. If the inclusion via overlapping consensus requirespeople to be ‘reasonable’, that is, to underwrite a civic morality as featuring the wellorderedand stable society, the ‘unreasonable’ turn out to be excluded from citizenry.My point is that the fair society may reach stability without moral consensus. Thefair society may be stable although a group or more groups of citizens do not endorseits moral essentials (autonomy, toleration, equality and so forth). These peopleare expected to be loyal to institutions although their loyalty could be unlikelywholehearted. However, a partial loyalty does not imply the risk to undermine peaceand coexistence. On the contrary the so-called unreasonable may be citizens on thesame footing as the other albeit their citizenship would be backed by non-sharablemotives, that is, by non-public reasons. These motives may indeed derive from theirown traditions – be they habits, customs, beliefs, attachments, the not chosen featuresof belonging to their group.

Tradizione e cittadinanza. Il modus vivendi come modo per l'inclusione dei "non ragionevoli"

SALA , ROBERTA
2012

Abstract

My contribution aims at drawing a new way of inclusion in the citizenry asalternative to the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This way should be able to includethe so called ‘unreasonable’ in the public debate. These people are ‘unreasonable’as they do not share public values but firmly hold a traditional set of values oftenconflicting with the public ones. My point is that a stable modus vivendi represents amore realistic device of inclusion. If the inclusion via overlapping consensus requirespeople to be ‘reasonable’, that is, to underwrite a civic morality as featuring the wellorderedand stable society, the ‘unreasonable’ turn out to be excluded from citizenry.My point is that the fair society may reach stability without moral consensus. Thefair society may be stable although a group or more groups of citizens do not endorseits moral essentials (autonomy, toleration, equality and so forth). These peopleare expected to be loyal to institutions although their loyalty could be unlikelywholehearted. However, a partial loyalty does not imply the risk to undermine peaceand coexistence. On the contrary the so-called unreasonable may be citizens on thesame footing as the other albeit their citizenship would be backed by non-sharablemotives, that is, by non-public reasons. These motives may indeed derive from theirown traditions – be they habits, customs, beliefs, attachments, the not chosen featuresof belonging to their group.
Rawls; liberalismo; irragionevoli
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11768/3824
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