It is often contended that certain enhancement technologies are acceptable, because they simply update traditional ways of pursuing the improvement of human capacities. This is not true with reference to moral bioen- hancement, because of the radical difference between tra- ditional and biotechnological ways of producing moral pro- gress. These latter risk having serious negative effects on our moral agency, by causing a substantial loss of freedom and capacity of authentic moral behaviour, by affecting our moral identity and by imposing a standard conception of moral personality.
The Moral Agency Argument Against Moral Bioenhancement / Reichlin, Massimo. - In: TOPOI. - ISSN 0167-7411. - 38:1(2019), pp. 53-62. [10.1007/s11245-017-9471-y]
The Moral Agency Argument Against Moral Bioenhancement
REICHLIN, MASSIMO
2019-01-01
Abstract
It is often contended that certain enhancement technologies are acceptable, because they simply update traditional ways of pursuing the improvement of human capacities. This is not true with reference to moral bioen- hancement, because of the radical difference between tra- ditional and biotechnological ways of producing moral pro- gress. These latter risk having serious negative effects on our moral agency, by causing a substantial loss of freedom and capacity of authentic moral behaviour, by affecting our moral identity and by imposing a standard conception of moral personality.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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