Against phenomenological externalism

In this paper, we maintain that no extant argument in favor of so-called phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. (PE) is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely, that is, in extrinsic terms, insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties the experience puts its bearer in relation with. We will consider what we take to be the five best arguments for phenomenal externalism: the ‘irrelevance of indistinguishability’- argument, the transparency argument, the error argument, the individuation argument, and the weirdness argument. We will try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. As things stand, unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism will show up in the debate, we presently see no reason to relinquish an idea that sounds intuitive and has attracted many cognitive scientists. This is the idea that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic, hence monadic aka non-relational, properties of our experiences. Such an idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism (PI).