Modern tradition takes a person to be a rational (and moral) agent, namely an agent capable of acting on the basis of reasons – often desire-independent reasons, and particularly moral reasons. So, agency and freedom are involved in the definition of personhood. But what about the embodiment of persons? What about their rootedness in the particular circumstances of a human life – time, space, community of origin, material, and axiological culture? What about the individual identity of persons, their irreducible individuality? The phenomenological notion of intentionality has a widely neglected richness of content, making it a key conceptual tool, capable of explaining not only consciousness but also rational agency, that is personhood, right from the level of the most basic and embodied instances of consciousness: perception, emotion, and spontaneous action. The theory of acts here proposed purports to be an original contribution to a genetic phenomenology of embodied, individualized personhood and rational agency.
Intentionality, Agency and Personhood: Outline of a Phenomenological Theory of Acts / De Monticelli, R. - In: PHÄNOMENOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNGEN. - ISSN 0342-8117. - 2018:2(2019). [10.28937/1000108206]
Intentionality, Agency and Personhood: Outline of a Phenomenological Theory of Acts
De Monticelli, R
2019-01-01
Abstract
Modern tradition takes a person to be a rational (and moral) agent, namely an agent capable of acting on the basis of reasons – often desire-independent reasons, and particularly moral reasons. So, agency and freedom are involved in the definition of personhood. But what about the embodiment of persons? What about their rootedness in the particular circumstances of a human life – time, space, community of origin, material, and axiological culture? What about the individual identity of persons, their irreducible individuality? The phenomenological notion of intentionality has a widely neglected richness of content, making it a key conceptual tool, capable of explaining not only consciousness but also rational agency, that is personhood, right from the level of the most basic and embodied instances of consciousness: perception, emotion, and spontaneous action. The theory of acts here proposed purports to be an original contribution to a genetic phenomenology of embodied, individualized personhood and rational agency.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.